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Summary
The second session of the 109th Congress has begun to face decisions regarding
the preparation of U.S. military forces for stability missions, a major subset of which
is peace operations.  A November 28, 2005, Department of Defense (DOD) directive
that designates stability operations as “core missions” of the U.S. military marks a
major shift in attitudes regarding peacekeeping and related stability operations (also
known as stabilization and reconstruction operations).
For well over a decade, some Members of Congress expressed reservations about
U.S. military involvement in peacekeeping operations.  The Bush Administration
initially opposed such missions and took steps to reduce the commitment of U.S.
troops to international peacekeeping.  This action reflected a  major  concern of the
1990s: that peacekeeping duties had overtaxed the shrinking U.S. military force and
were detrimental to military “readiness” (i.e., the ability of U.S. troops to defend the
nation). Many perceived these tasks as an inefficient use of U.S. forces, better left to
other nations while the U.S. military concentrated on operations requiring high-
intensity combat skills.   Others thought that the United States should adjust force size
and structure to accommodate the missions.
The events of September 11, 2001, brought new concerns to the fore and
highlighted the value to U.S. national security of ensuring stability around the world.
The 9/11 Commission report, which cited Afghanistan as a sanctuary for terrorists,
pointed to the dangers of allowing actual and potential terrorist sanctuaries to exist.
In 2003, the U.S.-led occupation of Iraq, often referred to as a “stabilization and
reconstruction” operation (which manifests some characteristics of a peace operation),
reinforced the argument.
Thousands of U.S. military personnel currently serve in or support peacekeeping
operations, although the number of troops serving in U.N. operations has decreased
dramatically since the mid-1990s.  About 28 U.S. servicemembers now serve in five
operations under U.N. control.  In the Balkans, some 1,800 U.S. troops serve with the
NATO Kosova Force (KFOR).  About 35,000 more serve in or support peacekeeping
operations in South Korea, and roughly 700 serve in the Sinai.   In Iraq, U.S. troops
are involved in a variety of stability tasks, including “nation-building” activities that
have been undertaken in some peacekeeping operations.  Such activities are also
carried out by a few hundred U.S. troops in Afghanistan.  
A major issue Congress continues to face is  what, if any, adjustments should be
made in order for the U.S. military to perform peacekeeping and stability missions 
— in Afghanistan, Iraq, or elsewhere — with less strain on the force, particularly the
reserves.  Of particular interest is whether the size and configuration of U.S. forces,
especially the Army, should be further modified. Additional issues are whether to
augment civilian and international capabilities in order to take on more of the burden.
This report replaces CRS Issue Brief IB94040, Peacekeeping and Related
Stability Operations: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement, by Nina M. Serafino.
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1  Although the costs of peacekeeping assistance and participation  are not as salient an issue
as in the 1990s, when the United States participated in or provided substantial military
assistance to several U.N. peacekeeping operations, the incremental costs  (i.e., costs over
and above the cost of maintaining, training, and equipping the U.S. military in peacetime)
(continued...)
Peacekeeping and Related Stability
Operations: Issues of U.S. Military
Involvement
U.S. policymakers have grappled for a decade and a half with issues involved in
deploying U.S. military personnel to conduct “peacekeeping” missions.  This broad,
generic term is most generally used to denote missions to maintain peace and establish
the basis for representative governance and economic growth.  Since the first U.S.
troops were deployed to post-Cold War peacekeeping missions in the early 1990s,
Congressional debate has ranged from the broad strategic question — how and when
do such operations serve U.S. interests? — to a myriad of practical questions that has
evolved over time.  See Table 1 at the end of this report for a breakdown of the
Department of Defense (DOD) Incremental Cost of Peacekeeping and Security
Contingency Operations, FY1991 to FY2005.  As of the second session of the 109th
Congress, the most salient practical issues focus on two central questions:  how are
U.S. forces to be best prepared to undertake such missions and what part of the
responsibility should they bear for such missions?  
The Bush Administration has launched several initiatives  intended to equip the
United States to conduct peacekeeping and related post-conflict operations (such as
the occupation of Iraq in 2003) more efficiently and effectively.  Most importantly for
the U.S. military, on  November 28, 2005, the Department of Defense (DOD) issued
a directive setting forth a new DOD policy regarding stability operations, particularly
peacekeeping and related post-conflict operations.   DOD is developing
recommendations that are likely to become the center of Congressional debate shortly.
This report will provide background information on the development of U.S.
military involvement in peacekeeping and related stability operations, the evolution
of terminology, and current U.S. participation in such operations.  It will then discuss
DOD Directive 3000.05, providing a guide to the issues addressed by the directive,
as well as proposed reforms and legislation pertaining to it.  These issues involve
practical questions such as: How should the U.S. armed forces be resized, reorganized,
educated, trained and equipped to perform these operations effectively without
detracting from its ability to perform combat missions?  What tasks must be
performed by the U.S. military in such operations and which can be delegated to other
entities? This report will provide an overview of these issues and references to other
sources which explore them.1  It will be updated as warranted.
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of the larger stability operations in Iraq and Afghanistan are a continuing concern. This
report does not address cost issues.  For more information on incremental costs and attempts
to create more efficient methods of funding such operations, see CRS Report 98-823,
Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions
and Answers, by Nina M. Serafino; and CRS Report RL32141, Funding for Military and
Peacekeeping Operations: Recent History and Precedents, by Jeffrey Chamberlin.  For
information on the cost of U.N. operations, see CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations
Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie Ann Browne.
2 Numbers of troops in this section were taken from CRS Report RL30184, Military
Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia: Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons
Learned” for Kosovo, May 20, 1999, except for figures in the paragraph on UNOSOM II,
which were compiled from The Blue Helmets: A Review Of United Nations Peace-keeping,
3rd edition. New York: United Nations Department of Public Information, 1996, p. 317 , and
Kenneth Allard.  Somalia Operations: Lessons Learned.  Washington, DC: NDU Press,
1995, pp. 18-19.  
The Evolution of U.S. Military Involvement in
Peacekeeping Operations2
The 1990s was the first decade in nearly half a century in which the U.S. military
was deployed on missions that involved the reconstruction of governments,
infrastructure, and economies after quelling the chaos of internecine conflicts.  The
post-World War II occupations in Germany, Japan, Italy and Austria were the most
prominent and successful mid-century precedents. Before that, U.S. military troops
were active in attempts to install more democratic governments in the Phillippines,
Central America, and the Caribbean in the last years of the 19th and early years of the
20th century.  The most recent round of such activity began soon after the end of the
Cold War in 1989 with a rise in the number of intrastate conflicts. 
Such “peacekeeping” missions require limitations on the use of force by combat
forces, as well as  the assignment of numerous personnel to provide security and to
carry out political and economic activities to construct or reconstruct state institutions.
These requirements have been problematic for many policymakers and for the U.S.
armed forces, which have preferred to confront an enemy with the degree of force
necessary to quickly defeat armed opponents (often referred to as “decisive” or
“overwhelming” force) and to reserve  its highly-skilled troops for combat missions.
Nevertheless, in the post-Cold War years of the 1990s, peacekeeping and related
limited force operations became a staple of U.S. military forces,  particularly the U.S.
Army. 
During the 1990s, the United States took a leading role in four large
multinational operations with peacekeeping phases under U.S, or NATO and U.N.
auspices: Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, (all under U.N. mandates) and Kosovo.  At the same
time, it provided varying degrees of support through the Department of Defense
(DOD) for U.N. missions in which few or no U.S. soldiers took part, e.g., Cambodia,
Angola, the Western Sahara and East Timor. 
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3 John L. Hirsch and Robert Oakley.  Somalia and Operation Restore Hope: Reflections on
Peacemaking and Peacekeeping.  Washington, DC: U.S. Institute of Peace, 1995. p 75.
4 Ibid, pp 81-89.  
5 See Michael Bailey, Robert Macguire and J. O’Neil G. Pouliot.  Haiti: Military-Police
Partnership for Public Security in Policing the New World Disorder: Peace Operations and
Public Security, edited by Robert B. Oakley, Michael J. Dziedzic, and Eliot M. Goldberg.
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U.S. military involvement in this new era of state-building (or “nation-building”)
missions began with the U.S.-led ad hoc multilateral coalition operation in Somalia.
The Unified Task Force or UNITAF with 25,800 U.S. troops at peak and over 10,000
from other countries, was launched in December 1992 as a humanitarian aid mission
to provide protection for relief workers and food convoys. (It was preceded by a
smaller U.S. humanitarian relief  mission from August-December 1992.)
Nevertheless, contingents from other countries were active “in community
development projects such as rebuilding schools, building roads, and repairing
irrigation canals and tube wells...” and the “Australians, Canadians, and French
worked hard to revive broad community leadership, encouraging the creation of local
councils and Somali police units.”3 Informal political development at the local level
and the repair and rebuilding of physical infrastructure (including road and bridge
building, well-digging, and the establishment of schools and hospitals) became de
facto UNITAF tasks, although the participation of U.S. military personnel in such
activities appears to have been limited.  U.S. military personnel were involved,
however, in the development of a Somalia police force, even though that was never
officially a UNITAF function.4  
The U.S.-led Somalia operation was turned over in May 1993 to the smaller
U.N. UNOSOM II force, with an authorized strength of 28,000 military personnel but
which operated for the most part with fewer.  UNOSOM II included some 2,800
civilian staff and had a broad mandate to build new local, regional, and national
political and administrative institutions.  Some 3,000 U.S. soldiers served in the U.N.
mission, primarily providing logistics support. (Another 17,700 in a separate operation
under U.S. command supported UNOSOM II, including a 1,150-soldier Quick
Reaction Force.) The failure of the Somalia operations led to chaos.  The U.S. assisted
with the U.N. withdrawal in March 1995, in the midst of continuing instability.  The
U.S. had withdrawn its separate combat force in March 1994, five months after
Somali rebels dragged the body of a U.S. soldier through the streets of Mogadishu, the
capital city.
       
U.S. troops were deployed in September 1994 to Haiti to restore to power
deposed President Jean Bertrand Aristide.  When U.S. troops were dispatched, it was
with the expectation that the multinational force (MNF) would complete its limited
mission and soon cede to a U.N. force with a state-building mandate.  Largely
comprised of U.S. soldiers, who totaled 21,000 at peak strength, the MNF turned the
operation over to the follow-on U.N. Mission in Haiti (UNMIH) in March 1994. This
was not, however, before the general lawlessness throughout Haiti drew U.S. troops
into assisting with the reconstruction and improvement of rule of law institutions and
facilities (i.e., the police, court system, and prisons), as well as in disarming and
demobilizing Haitian  soldiers.5  In the absence of sufficient civilian personnel, the
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Washington, DC: National Defense University Press. 1998.    
U.S. military became involved in revamping the police, judicial, and prison systems
as part of its primary task of establishing security.  A large number of U.S. soldiers,
some 2,400, were assigned initially to the 6,000-man UNMIH force.  
U.S. military experiences in Somalia and Haiti stigmatized peacekeeping and
nation-building for many Members as an inefficient and inappropriate use of military
resources, leading to restrictions on U.S. involvement in dealing with deteriorating
conditions in the Balkans in the mid-1990s.  U.S. involvement in that region began
in 1992 when the United States contributed a relatively small number of troops, about
1,000 of the 38,000-soldier UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) that was deployed in
February to Croatia and in June to Bosnia-Herzegovina.  The United States took a
leading role, however,  in NATO  air operations which supported the UNPROFOR)
to quell the conflict that accompanied the 1991 break-up of Yugoslavia, as well as
related air drops of humanitarian relief.  The NATO air operations provided
UNPROFOR with information collected by reconnaissance aircraft, supervised
established no-fly zones, and supported UNPROFOR troops when they came under
attack.  
The United States also took the initial lead role in the two subsequent NATO
ground forces that were sent to enforce the December 1995 Dayton Peace Accords
among Bosnia’s warring factions:  the one-year Implementation Force or IFOR, with
16,500 U.S. troops of a total of 54,000 soldiers, and the 1996-2004 Stabilization Force
or SFOR, with 6,900 U.S. troops at peak.  In the Bosnia mission, responsibility for
state-building tasks was divided among many organizations.  The Dayton accords
assigned disarmament and demobilization to the NATO force, which also provided
security for elections organized by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in
Europe (OSCE).  The U.N. Mission in Bosnia (UNMIBH) was responsible for the
establishment of a police force, as well as other law enforcement assistance, and
coordinating other U.N. agencies. Overall coordination of civilian contributions and
monitoring of the implementation of the Dayton accords was carried out by the High
Representative for the Implementation of the Peace Agreement, an innovative post
established by the Dayton accords. Foreign military troops carried out “nation-
building” civic action projects as a supplement to their patrolling duties.   U.S.
military troops mostly did not because of U.S. policymakers’ concerns for their safety
and political opposition to concept of “nation-building” as an appropriate role for U.S.
troops.  
The United States  led the NATO air mission in Kosovo in April-June 1999 and
the initial NATO ground mission — Kosovo Force or KFOR — but the civilian U.N.
“transitional” administration (UN Mission in Kosovo or UNMIK) has overseen most
tasks of administering governmental tasks from the outset.     
Each deployment was accompanied by vigorous debate as to what U.S. interests
were served by that particular mission and by peacekeeping operations in general.  In
the wake of the Cold War, with the demise of U.S.-Soviet superpower competition
and support for clients in strategic areas, some policymakers cherished hopes that the
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6 In addition to the social costs of lives lost and the creation of many, indeed sometimes tens
or hundreds of thousands of internally displaced persons and refugees seeking safety in
other nations, political instability — including  tensions between armed groups, sporadic
hostilities, and continuing conflict — has significant economic costs.  These include new
or continuing defense expenditures for the countries involved and perhaps also for
neighboring countries seeking to protect their borders.  lost opportunities in trade, contracts,
and domestic and foreign investment.   For international donors, they include the costs of
providing food, shelter, medical care and relocation assistance.
7 The “Weinberger doctrine” of Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger, outlined in a
speech before the National Press Club in Washington, DC on November 28, 1984, that
combat forces should only be committed where a “particular engagement or occasion is
deemed vital to our national interest or that of our allies.”   George Schulz countered in a
speech at Yeshiva University, New York, on December 8, 1984, with the guidelines that
U.S. power was legitimately used if it “can help liberate a people or support the yearning
for freedom...” and  “prevents others from abusing their power through aggression or
oppression....” Both speeches are reproduced in CRS Report 94-805 F, The Use of Force:
Key Statements by Weinberger, Shultz, Aspin, Bush, Powell, Albright, and Perry. (archived
available from author)
8 For arguments on the dangers of weak and failed states, see The 9/11 Commission Report:
Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist Attacks upon the United States, New
York: W.W. Norton and Company, 2004, and On the Brink: A Report of the Commission on
Weak States and US National Security, sponsored by the Center for Global Development,
May 2004.  Countering arguments are found in: Patrick Stewart.  Weak States and Global
Threats: Assessing Evidence of “Spillovers.”  Working Paper No. 73, Center for Global
Development, January 2006; and Justin Logan and Christopher Preeble.  Failed States and
Flawed Logic: The Case against a Standing Nation-Building Office.  CATO Policy Analysis
Paper No. 560, Cato Institute, January 11, 2006. 
“new world order” would provide the opportunity for the spread of freedom and
democracy. Instead, the number of intrastate conflicts rose as weakened autocrats
faced challengers who perceived new possibilities to achieve power, often with
assistance from neighboring states and influences.  Many argued that the prospects for
global instability and humanitarian concerns demanded an international military
response to such conflict, with U.S. participation or leadership, to forestall the
immeasurable but often nonetheless substantial human, social, and economic costs of
instability and conflict.6  They argued that the  U.S. should be willing to commit
forces to prevent abuses of power and to support  other peoples’ struggles for freedom.
Others argued that instability in many other countries did not meet the test of a threat
to U.S. vital interests, which was the threshold for many policymakers for the use of
U.S. force.7
The terrorist acts against the United States of September 11, 2001, changed the
debate.  It illustrated for many policymakers and analysts the dangers of allowing
instability to fester and conflicts to go unchecked, even in areas of minimal or no
strategic or economic interest.  While there is not a universal consensus around the
argument that international terrorists will find safe haven in weak and failed states,
there are powerful examples.  The perception that they may do so has convinced many
policymakers of the need to enhance the ability, including the military capacity, of the
United States and other countries to deal with instability and conflict.8     
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9 For some analysts, there is virtually no difference between peace enforcement operations
and low-intensity conflict, save the existence of a peace plan or agreement that has a degree
of local consent.
Evolving Terminology and Definitional Problems
Over the past decade and a half, there has been an evolution in the vocabulary
used to refer to activities that are undertaken to maintain, enforce, promote and
enhance the possibilities for peace in unstable environments.  “Peacekeeping” has
been the traditional generic term for the operations undertaken for those purposes by
the United Nations and other international organizations, and sometimes ad hoc
coalitions of nations or individual nations.  More recently, in an attempt to capture the
ambiguity and complexity of such operations, and perhaps also to avoid the stigma of
failure attached to peacekeeping, they have become known as “stabilization and
reconstruction” (S&R) operations, or, more simply, “stability” operations.  Use of any
term with the word “peace” created a semantic dilemma, conveying the misleading
impression that an operation is without risk, when in fact, peacekeeping operations
can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war.  As knowledge increased about
the conditions needed to establish peace, operations increasingly included extensive
“nation-building” (or state-building as some prefer to call it) components to build or
reform government structures.
The term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when U.N.
peacekeeping mostly fit a narrow definition:  providing an “interpositional” force to
supervise the keeping of a cease-fire or peace accord that parties in conflict had
signed, but it continued to be used as the range of activities grew.  In 1992, the U.N.
began to use a broader terminology to describe the different types of activities in
securing and keeping peace.  It created the term “peace enforcement” to describe
operations in unstable situations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force to
maintain peace because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety.9
“Peacebuilding” was adopted as a term for activities that are designed to prevent the
resumption or spread of conflict, including disarmament and demobilization of
warring parties, repatriation of refugees, reform and strengthening of government
institutions (including re-creating police or civil defense forces), election-monitoring,
and promotion of political participation and human rights.  Organizing and providing
security for humanitarian relief efforts can be a part of peacekeeping and peace
enforcement operations.  The U.N., NATO, and ad hoc coalition missions that the
United States participated in with significant forces in the early 1990s (Bosnia, Haiti,
Somalia) were generally referred to by the generic term of “peacekeeping” by
Congress, even though U.S. executive branch agencies replaced “peacekeeping” with
“peace operations” as the generic term.   
Recently, such operations have been referred to by an Army doctrinal term
“stability operations” that also encompasses the diverse missions of operations in
Afghanistan and Iraq.  This may be a more precise term for such operations, as many
include not only peace operations (i.e., peacekeeping and peace enforcement), but also
related missions such as humanitarian and civic assistance, counterterrorism, counter-
drug, and counter-insurgency (i.e., foreign internal defense) efforts, all of which also
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10 The other types of operations are security assistance, support to insurgencies,
noncombatant evacuations, arms control and shows of force.  For further information on the
activities which fall under each of these types of operations, see Army Field Manual FM-
307, Stability Operations and Support Operations, February 2003.
are included under the term “stability operations.”10  Stability operations are
sometimes referred to as “Phase IV” or  “post-conflict” operations, although
reoccurrences of conflict are often possible. 
 In the wake of U.S. military action in Iraq, the question of continued U.S.
military involvement has been framed in terms of whether the U.S. military should do
“nation-building,” and if it does, how it should prepare for it.  Like peacekeeping,
nation-building is not a precise term, but rather one that is used for both a concept and
a variety of activities.  On one level, nation-building is used to refer to the concept of
creating (or a decision to create) a democratic state, often in a post-conflict situation.
 The term is also used, however, to refer to any of the range of activities that militaries
or civilians undertake to advance that goal.  (A 2003 RAND report, America’s Role
in Nation-Building from Germany to Iraq, uses the term to encompass the full range
of activities undertaken by the United States, including by its military forces, in
operations that have been variously known as an occupation, peacekeeping, peace
enforcement, and S&R.)
  
As most often used when referring to the U.S. military, nation-building refers to
a range of activities to assist civilians beyond providing security and humanitarian aid
in emergency situations. These can include projects such as the repair, maintenance,
or construction of economic infrastructure, including roads, schools, electric grids, and
heavy industrial facilities, and of health infrastructure, such as clinics and hospitals,
and water and sewage facilities.  They can also include the provision of a variety of
services, such as medical services to refugee and impoverished populations, and
training and assistance to police, the military,  the judiciary, and prison officials as
well as other civil administrators
The November 2005 DOD stability operations directive cites the specific tasks
of rebuilding indigenous institutions (including various types of security forces,
correctional facilities, and judicial systems) necessary to stabilize a situation; reviving
or building the private sector, including bottom-up economic activity and constructing
necessary infrastructure, and developing representative government institutions as
among those tasks that are performed in stability operations. These tasks are also part
of the continuum of activities that fall under the term “stabilization and
reconstruction” (S&R) which also has been used to describe these complex operations.
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping and
Related Stability Missions
The level of U.S. military participation in peacekeeping is much reduced from
the 1990s, if the occupation force in Iraq is excluded. Still, thousands of U.S. military
personnel participate full-time in a variety of activities that fall under the rubric of
peacekeeping operations, most endorsed by the U.N. 
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11 While the reduction in U.S. troops involved in peacekeeping, especially U.N.
peacekeeping, from the early 1990s responded to perceptions that peacekeeping excessively
strained U.S. forces without significantly serving U.S. interests, some analysts continue to
argue that greater  participation of U.S. forces in U.N. peacekeeping would be desirable.
In June 2005, the Congressionally-mandated Task Force on the U.N., chaired by former
Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich and former Senate Majority Leader George Mitchell,
called for greater U.S. support of U.N. operations.  The Task Force report recommended that
U.N. Member States should substantially increase the number of trained and equipped forces
for rapid deployment for peace operations and that the Department of Defense should
“prepare options for additional means to support U.N. peace operations with logistics,
capacity-building assistance, and other means” and “for U.S. engagement in peace
operations consistent with U.S. national interests.”  It specifically recommended that the
United States “consider upgrading its participation” in the U.N. Stand-by Arrangements
system, through which countries volunteer capabilities for U.N. peace operations.
(American Interests and U.N. Reform: Report of the Task Force on the United Nations.
Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, June 2005.  Quotes taken from pp. 11, 24
and 97.)  
Some military analysts argue that the U.N. does not necessarily need more U.S. troops
to place in field-level observer slots in U.N. missions.  What is needed, they say, are staff
officers at the headquarters command level whose training and mindset enables them to
think proactively about dealing with developing problems.  Others believe that U.S. soldiers
with engineering and skills using advanced communications technologies would also be
useful.
Very few U.S. military personnel currently serve under U.N. command.  As of
April 30, 2006, 28 U.S. military personnel were serving in five U.N. peacekeeping or
related operations.  These operations are located in the Middle East (3 U.S. military
observers or “milobs” in the Sinai operation), Georgia (2 milobs), Ethiopia/Eritrea (7
milobs), Liberia (7 milobs and 5 troops), and Haiti (4 troops).  Other U.S. forces are
deployed in unilateral U.S. operations and coalition operations, most undertaken with
U.N. authority.11  
In the Balkans, U.S. troops were largely  withdrawn from Bosnia with the
December 2, 2004 end of the NATO operation there, but as of April 2006 some 220
U.S. troops supported the European Union operation in Bosnia as part of NATO’s
supporting headquarters unit.  A U.S. peacekeeping contingent, numbering 1,800 as
of April 2006, remains with the 16,800 troop NATO operation in Kosovo, with others
supporting them from Macedonia.  (Numbers in Kosovo fluctuate by the hundreds
with rotations.)  Roughly 700 U.S. troops serve in the Sinai-based coalition
Multilateral Force (MFO), which has no U.N. affiliation.  As of April 2006, about 170
U.S. military personnel support the NATO International Security Assistance Force
(ISAF) in Afghanistan.
The United States has other troops abroad in operations that are related to, but
not  counted as, peacekeeping.  Roughly some 35,000 U.S. troops have been serving
in South Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority.
(Although technically “peacekeeping,” this deployment has long been treated as a
standard U.S. forward presence mission.)  A drawdown is scheduled to reduce the
number to 25,000 in 2006.  Less than 100 U.S. troops are attached to the NATO
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peacekeeping operation in Afghanistan, providing various forms of U.S. assistance for
ISAF peacekeeping.  (Some 23,000 U.S. troops are present in Afghanistan in other
roles, however, including a few hundred involved in nation-building activities.  See
section on Afghanistan, below.) 
The Bush Administration’s Policy
Despite President Bush’s stated dislike for open-ended “nation-building”
missions involving U.S. ground forces during his first presidential campaign, as
President he has been willing to maintain troops in peacekeeping missions to the
extent he deems necessary.  During his Administration, President Bush sought and
achieved substantial reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo and thus far has resisted calls
to provide U.S. troops for patrolling and other peacekeeping tasks with the
international peacekeeping force in Afghanistan.
Reductions in Bosnia and Kosovo.  The Bush Administration sought to
minimize forces in the two NATO Balkans peacekeeping operations through
negotiations with U.S. allies, following established NATO procedures. The U.S.
presence in Bosnia dropped steadily during the Bush Administration from some 4,200
participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) at the beginning of
2001 to under 1,000 in 2004.  U.S. participation ended on  December 2, 2004, when
the European Union assumed responsibility for the operation.  U.S. troops may
continue to play some role as NATO continues to support the EU with intelligence
and assistance in apprehending indicted war criminals.  (See CRS Report RS21774,
Bosnia and the European Union Military Force (EUFOR): Post-NATO Transition.)
Similarly, the U.S. presence in Kosovo has dropped from some 5,600 involved in the
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in early 2001 to about 1,800 of the total 17,000 KFOR
force from about 36 nations.  (These numbers can fluctuate by the hundreds due to
rotations.)  In both cases, these reductions have taken place in the context of an overall
reduction of forces serving in the NATO peacekeeping missions.
NATO Peacekeeping and U.S. Operations in Afghanistan.   For some
time, the Bush Administration has maintained that no U.S. troops would participate
in peacekeeping operations in the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF),
despite calls by some analysts for a U.S. role.  With some 9,700 troops contributed by
about 37 NATO and non-NATO nations as of July 2006
([http://www.nato.int/issues/afghanistan]) and plans to increase that number to 16,000
shortly, ISAF patrols Kabul and its immediate surrounding areas under a U.N. Chapter
VII authorization and is expanding throughout the country.   (NATO assumed
command of ISAF on August 11, 2003, just over 18 months after ISAF was formed
in January 2002 as an ad hoc coalition operation of some 5,000 troops from 18 nations
under British command.)  The United States has some 23,000 soldiers deployed in
Afghanistan, according to DOD, most in continuing combat (hunting Al Qaeda), but
others in support, training, and reconstruction missions. U.S. troops provide some
assistance to the ISAF (i.e., logistical, intelligence, and quick reaction force support),
but they do not engage in ISAF peacekeeping. U.S. troops do, however, provide
training and assistance for the formation of an Afghani national military force, an
activity which some analysts label “nation-building.”
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Hundreds of U.S. troops have been involved since December 2002 in the
establishment and operation of Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs), which were
designed to create a secure environment for aid agencies involved in reconstruction
work in areas outside Kabul.  Each team includes 60-100 U.S. military personnel
(Special Forces and civil affairs reservists) and civilians.  As of April 2006, the United
States operates 13 PRTs, one of which is scheduled to be turned over to the United
Kingdom and another to the Netherlands during the summer of 2006. ISAF
involvement in PRTs began on January 6, 2004, when ISAF (by now under NATO)
marked the beginning of its operations outside Kabul by taking over the German-led
PRT in Konduz.  (As of the end of May 2005, ISAF ran 8 PRTs and two forward
support bases and planned to take on two more PRTs in the near future.)  Although
the U.S. military role in PRTs is not identified as “peacekeeping,” its objectives —
enhancing security, extending the reach of the central government, and facilitating
reconstruction — are similar to those of peacekeeping operations. Some analysts
consider it “nation-building.”  Thus far, the PRTs have not proven controversial in
Congress, although some humanitarian organizations have taken issue with them.
(For more on PRTs, see CRS Report RL30588, Afghanistan: Post-War Governance,
Security, and U.S. Policy, the United States Institute of Peace’s Special Report 147,
Provincial Reconstruction Teams and Military Relations with International and
Nongovernmental Organizations in Afghanistan,  and the section on nation-building
below.) 
Airlift in Africa.   The United States military occasionally provides airlift
assistance for peacekeeping missions in Africa.  For instance, the United States has
participated under NATO in airlifting African Union troops to the AU mission in
Darfur, Sudan.
The Extended U.S. Military “Stabilization” Presence in Iraq.   U.S.
troops in Iraq are engaged in a wide variety of activities, the most visible of which are
counterinsurgency operations, but some of which are generally classified as
peacekeeping duties. The activities undertaken by U.S. troops varies from area to area,
and some commanders have noted that their troops are doing a mix of both types of
operations.  (For more on this presence, see CRS Report RL31701, Iraq: U.S. Military
Operations; and CRS Report RL31339, Iraq: U.S. Regime Change Efforts and Post-
Saddam Governance.)
DOD Directive 3000.05: Mandates, Background, and
Related Legislation
In the wake of the coalition invasion of Iraq, the debate over the appropriate role
for the United States military in activities encompassed by the term peacekeeping has
again moved to the forefront. Although the current military occupation of  Iraq falls
in a gray area that defies easy definition, with a level of instability that many define
as low-intensity conflict rather than peace enforcement, many of the activities that the
U.S. military has undertaken there also have been undertaken in past peacekeeping
operations. Critics of the Bush Administration have charged that its disdain for
peacekeeping has led it to ignore the lessons of past operations and to err in its
judgment of the number and type of forces necessary in Iraq, putting the United States
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Defense Science Board Summer 2004 Study on Transition to and from Hostilities, December
2004, and Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on Institutionalizing Stability
Operations within DOD, September 2005.  (Access through the Defense Science Board
website [http://www.acq.osd.mil/dsb/report.htm].  The Board was tasked in August 2005
with a further study on the organizational changes that would be  needed within DOD to
conduct, support, and manage stability operations.  This has not been completed.
13 The increased frequency of operations (“optempo”) demanded by peacekeeping operations
in the 1990s took time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training.  The
problem of frequent deployments of individuals (“perstempo”) was  particularly severe for
the Army.  For several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to
peacekeeping operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding,
affecting morale by keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue,
affecting recruitment.  In one of the first publicly-available studies of peacekeeping stresses,
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and its allies at risk of “losing the peace” there.  Yet, the situation in Iraq appears to
have prompted the two Defense Science Board (DSB) studies12 that constitute the
foundation for Department of Defense (DOD) Directive 3000.05.
DOD Directive 3000.05 sets forth a radically new policy regarding missions
known as “stability” operations, a major subset of which are peacekeeping and other
peace operations.  The Directive on Military Support for Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operations designates stability operations as
“a core U.S. military mission.”  By elevating stability missions to the same priority
level as combat missions, DOD seems to acknowledge expectations that future
operations will regularly include missions to stabilize areas during transitions from
war to peace and to assist with reconstruction during those transitions.  For several
years, some military officers and defense analysts have argued that such efforts
required the systematic development of doctrine, training, education, exercises, and
planning capabilities to enable the armed forces to perform those operations
proficiently, as well as the reconfiguration and acquisition of organizations, personnel,
facilities, and materiél to support them.  The directive catalogues such needs and calls
for the development of specific recommendations to fulfill them.   
Two more recent documents make no mention of any further steps to enhance
DOD capabilities for such operations.  The DOD February 6, 2006 Quadrennial
Defense Review report (QDR), the document in which senior DOD civilian and
military leaders identify the capabilities and resources needed to carry out a
comprehensive defense strategy, did not specifically address the issue of post-conflict
operations. DOD officials state privately, however, that proposals regarding these
types of operations are being considered under the category of “irregular warfare”
because of problems arriving at a consensus on the appropriate terminology for
categorizing them.  The March 2006 National Security Strategy mentions the
development of U.S. civilian and international military capabilities to carry out post-
conflict operations, but does not mention augmenting U.S. military capabilities.
The U.S. military, particularly the Army, has made many adjustments over the
past several years to enable troops to perform more effectively in peacekeeping
operations in places such as Bosnia and Kosovo.13  Nevertheless, events in Iraq since
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in March 1995 the GAO reported (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) that increased deployments due to
peacekeeping together with reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps
units, and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces (such as quartermaster and
transportation units) and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of an major
regional contingency (MRC) to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond
quickly to an MRC. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found shortages in
forces needed for contingency operations, including active-duty civil affairs personnel,
Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully-trained and available Air Force
AWACS aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.  The Army took steps to deal with
some of its problems by the realignment and better management of its resources, as did the
Air Force, and by limiting deployments to six months (although this was overridden by
deployments to Iraq).
the United States invaded in 2003 have reinforced arguments that still greater efforts
must be made to raise the possibilities for successful transitions. The directive
provides the basis for instituting significant changes and dedicating substantial
resources to prepare troops to perform proficiently in such missions, although the
eventual effect on armed services is not known.  
The directive calls for changes in a wide variety of areas, some of which could
be implemented in short order, others of which would take considerable time.  DOD
is beginning to develop specific proposals to implement Directive 3000.05.  There  are
still areas where the directive lays out policy, but DOD currently is unsure of the steps
that it will take to implement it. DOD may bring to Congress during 2006 and 2007
several requests for changes in laws, authorities, and regulations necessary to
implement the directive and the QDR, as well as for additional funding. 
 The House Armed Services Committee (HASC), in its report accompanying the
FY2007 DOD authorization act (H.R. 5122, H.Rept. 109-452) noted that it was
pleased that DOD had issued the directive and stated its belief that DOD “should
integrate, to the greatest extent possible, SSTR-related requirements across its
doctrine, training logistics, organization, materiel, personnel, and facilities (DTLOM-
PF).”  HASC directed the Secretary of Defense to submit to the armed services
committees of both chambers an implementation report for all items, with “a special
focus on professional military education and training, including but not limited to
revisions to Academy and War College curricula, if any; training plans at the service
and joint operational levels; the possible creation of SSTR [Stability, Security,
Transition, and Reconstruction] fellowships within the Agency for International
Development or related organizations (including non-governmental organizations);
and any reorganization that will be required to implement the Directive.” 
Improving Military Capabilities
The Directive states that the UnderSecretary of Defense for Personnel and
Readiness should identify the personnel and training needed for stability operations
and evaluate DOD progress in developing those forces and training.  It does not
provide specific recommendations regarding the size and structure and specific
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14 Critics were disturbed by declines in ratings which measured combat readiness in the
1990s. There were a variety of reasons for these declines, some of which were addressed by
changes in military practices: (1) military personnel could not practice all their combat skills
while engaged  in peacekeeping operations; (2) in the 1990s, the U.S. military performed
these operations at the same time the armed forces, particularly the army, were reduced
substantially; (3) funds for training and equipment were diverted in the past to fund
peacekeeping operations; and (4) units were disrupted by the deployment of an individual
or a small number of individuals.  If one looked at the larger readiness problem of the 1990s
and early 2000s, that is  the perception that U.S. military personnel were overworked, that
military equipment was in poor shape, that spare parts were in short supply, and that the
military could not  recruit and retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to
readiness was less pronounced, according to some analysts.  Some have argued that the
readiness problem was exaggerated or non-existent, given the successful combat
performances of U.S. troops in Afghanistan in 2001 and in Iraq in 2003.
15  The September 2005 DSB report on institutionalizing stability operations notes that DOD
lacks “a sizing concept” that would enable the department to prepare “for concurrent
domestic stability operations, foreign stability operations and foreign combat operations; all
of which will call upon some of the same resource base.” (p. 11.)  The 2006 QDR report
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capabilities needed for stability operations, but does call for the incorporation of
stability operations instruction at all levels of education and training. 
Force Size and Structure.  Whether U.S. military forces should be sized and
organized specifically to facilitate peacekeeping and related stability operations has
been a longstanding issue.  Since the 1990s, many Members have questioned whether
U.S. military forces could maintain their “readiness” to perform their “core” war-
fighting mission if they engaged extensively in other activities.14   The size of the force
and the numbers of troops devoted to specific tasks have been recognized as two key
factors in the military’s ability to perform peacekeeping and related stability
operations while retaining its preparedness to fight wars.  (Also important are the size,
length and frequency of deployments and opportunities for training in combat skills
while deployed on such operations.) 
The size of the U.S. military is controversial in large part because the basic cost
of each added soldier is high, averaging $100,000 per year for an active duty troop,
according to a CBO estimate.  In the mid- to late 1990s, some policymakers and
military experts suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be a more
appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two major
theater wars (which was then the standard for sizing force structure) and also to
engage in peacekeeping missions.  (For the 14 years after the end of the Vietnam War
in 1975 through the end of the Cold War in 1989, the Army had averaged some
778,000, with fluctuations.)  Other policymakers would prefer further cuts in
personnel to conserve funds for modernizing equipment and weapons systems.
 The November 2005 stability operations directive points to possible increases in
the numbers of certain specialities in high demand in peacekeeping and related
stability operations (i.e., civil affairs officers, foreign area specialists, military police,
engineers, and psychological operations personnel) as mentioned above, but no further
changes in size or structure.15  Others have urged more extensive changes in the force
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states that Army end-strength should be stabilized at 482,400 Active and 533,000 reserve
component personnel by FY2011.  (p. 43) The 2006 QDR report calls for further increases
in certain specialties.  It calls for increasing the number of Special Forces battalions by one-
third starting in FY2007 and expanding psychological operations and civil affairs units by
one-third (3,700 personnel).  In another area that may be at least partially related to conflict
transitions and post-conflict operations, it also calls for the establishment of a Marine Corps
Special Operations Command of 2,600 personnel to train foreign military units and conduct
direct action and special reconnaissance.
 For FY2007, the House and Senate versions of the National Defense Authorization
bills (H.R. 5122 and S. 2766) would increase the active duty Army end-strength to 512,400,
an increase of 30,000.  The legislation would also increase the size of the Marine Corps by
either 5,000 (House) or 10,000 (Senate).  (For further information, see CRS Report
RL33405, Defense: FY2007 Authorization and Appropriations,  by Stephen Daggett, and
CRS Report RS21754, Military Forces: What is the Appropriate Size for the United States?,
by Edward F. Bruner.) 
to better accommodate such missions.  The Army has long rejected  proposals for
dedicated peacekeeping forces, primarily on the grounds that they  would divert
resources from combat functions.  (For information on proposals for dedicating forces
to peacekeeping and related operations, see CRS Report RS22473,  Peacekeeping and
Related Stability Operations: Proposals for Army Force Structure Changes.) 
Any recommendations regarding force size and structure for stability operations
are likely to provoke intensive debate, as changes will involve either additional costs
or trade-offs with other military requirements, particularly modernizing equipment and
weapons systems.  Proposals to add troops are controversial in large part because the
basic cost of each added soldier is high, averaging $100,000 per year for an active
duty troop, according to a CBO estimate.  In the mid- to late 1990s, some
policymakers and military experts suggested that 520,000 to 540,000 troops would be
a more appropriate size for the Army if it were to prevail in the scenario involving two
major theater wars (which was then the standard for sizing force structure) and also
to engage in peacekeeping missions.  The extent to which additional military U.S.
forces are needed for such roles may depend heavily on what other capabilities are
developed for such operations, including civilians and foreign military forces.  
Stability Operations Curricula and Training.  The directive calls on DOD
to ensure that military schools and training centers incorporate stability operations
curricula in joint and individual service education and training programs at all levels.
It particularly calls for developing and incorporating instruction for foreign language
capabilities and regional area expertise, including “long-term immersion in foreign
societies.”  It would also broaden the exposure of military personnel to U.S. and
international civilians with whom they would work in stability operations by
providing them with tours of duty in other U.S. agencies, international organizations,
and non-governmental organizations. 
Apportioning Responsibilities
Establishing security in a post-conflict environment is indisputably a military
responsibility, but assigning specific responsibility for the state-building tasks is
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problematic.   Some policymakers and military officials have long believed that
nation-building is an inefficient and inappropriate use of military force.  Nevertheless,
some policymakers and analysts assert the need for military involvement in such tasks,
particularly when others are not available to undertake them in the immediate
aftermath of major combat.  
Nation-building tasks are often viewed as essential elements in stabilizing post-
conflict situations because they provide the physical and organizational infrastructure
populations need to help re-establish normal lives. Such activities are also viewed as
enhancing the legitimacy and extending the presence of  weak central governments as
they try to assert control in such situations, and as reassuring local populations of the
friendly intent of foreign military forces.  Sometimes, involvement in such activities
may enable armed forces to make more informed judgments about the security
situation in an area.   Some analysts view U.S. military nation-building as an essential
element in the U.S. toolkit to respond to the Congressionally-mandated 9/11
Commission’s recommendation to use all elements of national power “to keep
possible terrorists insecure and on the run....” 16
In immediate post-conflict situations, or extremely dangerous environments,
military forces may be the only personnel available to perform such tasks.  In hostile
environments, armed forces may be needed to provide security for relief workers
providing such assistance.  In less problematic circumstances, however, some argue
that the use of the military for such tasks can be detrimental to humanitarian and
reconstruction tasks.  Such critics feel that the use of troops for such purposes can
detract from a sense of returning normality and establishment of civilian control.
Where military and civilians are delivering assistance in the same areas, some
civilians feel that the military presence confuses the civilian role, and makes them
targets of armed opponents.   Because of that, many humanitarian groups have
objected to the concept of the Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs) that are well
established in Afghanistan and are being set up in Iraq.  
Civilian Capabilities to Perform Nation Building Tasks.  Several
proposals to build civilian capabilities to perform nation-building tasks, especially rule
of law tasks, in peacekeeping operations have been advanced.  No legislation was
passed in the 108th Congress despite the introduction of three bills, but some of the
proposed ideas were taken into consideration in the State Department’s establishment,
in July 2004, of a new Office of the Coordinator for Reconstruction and Stabilization
(S/CRS).  S/CRS’ function is to develop mechanisms to enhance civilian capabilities,
and to improve inter-agency coordination in planning and conducting S&R operations.
(For further details on S/CRS and relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32862,
Peacekeeping and Conflict Transitions: Background and Congressional Action on
Civilian Capabilities.)
Defense analysts and military experts have provided much of the impetus for the
concept of developing civilian capabilities for S&R missions.  The DSB’s summer
2004 study supported the development of civilian capabilities. According to the
unclassified version published in December 2004, the study described the S&R
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mission as “inescapable, its importance irrefutable” and argued that both DOD and the
Department of State need to augment S&R capabilities and to develop “an
extraordinarily close working relationship.”  In addition, the study found that the State
Department needs “to develop a capacity for operational planning [that] it does not
currently possess” and to develop “a more robust capacity to execute such plans.”17
The follow-up September 2005 DSB study expressed concern that S/CRS “is not
getting anywhere near the level of resources and authority needed.”  If DOD actions
in critical areas where there is an overlap between DOD and civilian responsibilities
“are not complemented by growth of capabilities in other agencies, the overall U.S.
ability to conduct successful stability operations will be far less than it should be.”18
The February 2006 QDR stated that DOD will support “substantially increased
resources” for S/CRS and for the establishment of a Civilian Reserve Corps and a
conflict response fund.  (p 86)
The Senate Armed Services Committee (SASC), in its report accompanying the
FY2006 DOD authorization bill (S. 1042, S.Rept. 109-69), commended DOD’s
“active support of and cooperation with” S/CRS and urged DOD “to continue to
deepen its coordination with the Department of State on planning for and participating
in post-conflict stability operations and reconstruction efforts.  The conference version
of the National Defense Authorization Act for FY2006 (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163)
provided authority to transfer up to $100 million in defense articles, services, training
or other support to the Department of State and other federal agencies for
reconstruction, security or stabilization assistance. The Administration had requested
$200 million for a State Department Conflict Response Fund for such purposes, but
neither authority nor funding was provided in non-military legislation.  According to
a DOD official, this authority is intended to support S/CRS in carrying out possible
activities.
FY2007 Legislation.  The House version of the FY2007 DOD authorization
bill (S. 5122) contains a provision (Section 1034) requiring the President to submit to
Congress by February 1, 2007, a report identifying the interagency capabilities needed
to achieve 21st century national security goals and objectives.  The president is to
formulate specific legislative proposals for improving interagency coordination. 
The SASC version of the FY2007 DOD authorization bill (S. 2766) contains a
provision (Section 1222) requiring the President to submit to Congress  “a plan to
establish interagency operating procedures for federal agencies to plan and conduct
stabilization and reconstruction operations” within six months of enactment. This plan
would include a delineation of the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of federal
departments and agencies in stabilization and reconstruction operations.  The SASC
bill also contains a requirement (Section 864) for “the Secretary of Defense, in
consultation with the Department of State and the heads of other appropriate
agencies,” to develop “an interagency plan for contingency program management
during combat operations and post-conflict operations.”  The plan is to be submitted
no later than one year after enactment.  In report language (S.Rept. 109-254), the
SASC directed the Secretary of Defense to conduct a study to develop greater
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interagency presence in the staffs of combatant commands:  The current presence of
civilians in those commands “is usually limited in number and serves primarily as a
liaison from the parent organization....” 
Improving Inter-Agency Cooperation and Coordination  
Responding to calls to enhance the ability of the wide variety of participants in
stability operations to work together, the directive provides a number of ways to
improve inter-agency (and international) cooperation and coordination in
multinational operations.  To that end, the directive called for the incorporation of
military personnel and civilians of many backgrounds in military education and
training courses, including personnel from U.S. departments and agencies, foreign
governments and security forces, international organizations, non-governmental
organizations, and members of the private sector in stability operations planning,
training, and exercises.  It also proposes that DOD ensure that instructors and students
from elsewhere in the U.S. government be able to receive or provide instruction in
stability operations at military schools.
The directive also calls for the creation of “a stability operations center to
coordinate operations research, education and training, and lessons-learned.”  The
U.S. military has two institutions currently devoted exclusively to such operations,
neither of which serves a coordinating function: the U.S. Army Peacekeeping and
Stability Operations Institute (PKSOI) at Carlisle Barracks, PA, and the Naval Post-
Graduate School’s Center for Stabilization and Reconstruction Study (CSRS). 
PKSOI assists with the development of Army doctrine at the strategic (i.e., the
leadership and planning) and operational levels, and helps the Army’s senior
leadership develop operational concepts.  It works with the UN, U.S. government
interagency groups, inter-service groups, and foreign militaries
([http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usacsl/divisions/pksoi/]).  CSRS’s mission, according
to its website, is “to educate the full spectrum of actors” involved in S&R activities
through educational, research, and outreach activities ([http://www.nps.edu/CSRS/]).
Military Personnel and Contractors
The directive reflects longstanding concerns that the U.S. armed services may not
possess enough people with the skills necessary for stability operations, in particular
peace operations.  The directive calls on the department to identify the personnel
needed for such operations and to develop methods to recruit, select, and assign
current and former DOD personnel with relevant skills.  The Under Secretary of
Defense for Personnel and Readiness is directed to recommend all necessary changes
in laws, authorities, and regulations to accomplish this.  In particular, the directive
reflects concern about developing enough foreign area officers, enlisted regional
specialists, civil affairs personnel, military police, engineers, and psychological
operations personnel.  These specialities have long been noted as having insufficient
personnel to meet the demands of the last dozen years.  The DSB Task Force report
of September 2005 report recommended that DOD develop special strategies to recruit
at mid-career, 35-45 year old professionals, with the skills  needed for stability
operations, to serve as Civil Affairs officers. 
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Certain points of the directive also suggest that DOD may wish to depend on
contractors for any additional personnel needed in stability operations.  In addition to
the mandate mentioned above that would bring former DOD personnel into the mix
of persons participating in stability operations, the directive mandates a check for
adequate oversight of contracts in stability operations and in the ability of U.S.
commanders in foreign countries to obtain contract support quickly.  The DSB Task
Force on institutionalizing stability operations labeled the private sector as DOD’s
“fifth force provider” for stability operations (in addition to the four branches of the
armed services) and recommended that DOD design a new institution that would
effectively use the private sector in stability operations. 
Improving International Capabilities
Directive 3000.05 calls for DOD to support the development of other countries’
security forces in order to ensure security domestically and to contribute forces to
stability operations elsewhere.  This includes helping such forces, including police
forces, develop “the training, structure, processes, and doctrine necessary to train,
equip, and advise large numbers of foreign forces in a range of security sectors....”  
Thus far, the United States supports training for international peacekeepers in
two ways, through the Global Peace Operations Initiative, run by the State
Department, and through DOD-sponsored training.  The February 2006 QDR report
stated that DOD would continue to support initiatives such as GOPI, and that it also
supports efforts to develop a NATO stabilization and reconstruction capability, a
European constabulary force, and the African Union’s development of a humanitarian
crisis intervention capability.  It also stated DOD “stands ready to increase its
assistance” to the U.N. peacekeeping operations department for doctrine, training,
strategic planning, and management.   
The Global Peace Operations Initiative.  The Bush Administration
proposed a five-year, multilateral Global Peace Operations Initiative (GPOI), to
prepare other, largely African, nations to participate in peacekeeping operations.
GPOI’s primary goal is to train and equip some 75,000 military forces, and to develop
gendarme forces (also known as constabulary police, i.e., police with military skills)
to participate in peacekeeping operations.  The Administration estimated the U.S. cost
at $661 million from FY2005-FY2009.  For 2005, Congress appropriated some $100
million for GPOI in the Consolidated Appropriations Act (H.R. 4818/P.L. 108-447).
The Bush Administration requested $114 million in State Department funding for
GPOI in FY2006; there was no earmarked appropriation, but the estimated FY2006
allocation is $100.4 million.  The FY2007 request is $102.6 million.  (For more
information on GPOI and relevant legislation, see CRS Report RL32773, The Global
Peace Operations Initiative: Background and Issues for Congress.) 
Other Training.    In 2005, Congress authorized DOD to establish a new
program for training and educating foreign military forces under Section 1206 of the
the FY2006 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1815, P.L. 109-163, signed January 6,
2006.).  This provision permits U.S. military personnel to train foreign military forces
for counterterrorism operations and for military and stability operations in which U.S.
armed forces participate. This year, DOD seeks to expand that authority.  Section 1206
training and education are intended not only to increase the ability of foreign forces
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to take part in military operations, but also to increase the “interoperability” (i.e., the
ability of military forces to communicate and otherwise interact effectively in order
to avoid losses due to increased confusion in hostile situations).   
Section 1206 of the SASC version of the FY2007 DOD authorization bill (S.
2766), Authority to Build the Capacity of Foreign Military and Security Forces,
provides, with some modifications, changes requested by DOD to amend Section 1206
in P.L. 109-163.  The Section 1206 amendment would provide increased flexibility
by permitting the Secretary of Defense, with the concurrence of the Secretary of State,
to authorize the training rather than requiring a presidential order.  SASC did not
broaden the authority, as DOD  requested, to include other security forces (i.e., police
forces) nor raise the amount of funding. Section 1206 would  authorize annual
expenditures of $200 million ($50 million per geographical combatant commander)
in FY2007 and FY2008 for training purposes.    
Two related sections in S. 2766, Section 1207 (Participation in Multilateral
Military Organizations) and Section 1208 (Interoperability Development and
Training) would provide new authorities: Section 1207 provides authority to for the
Secretary of Defense to assist multilateral Centers of Excellence with operations and
maintenance funds and the provisions of logistics, supplies, and services, to develop
doctrine, education, training and to test new concepts.  Section 1208 allows DOD to
provide electronic educational materials, along with related technology and software,
for the education and training of military and civilian government personnel of foreign
counties and of internationally recognized non-governmental organizations.
Providing Flexible Funding
DOD Directive 3000.05 calls for the Under Secretary of Defense Comptroller to
“institutionalize procedures to achieve rapid distribution of funding, goods, and
services, with appropriate accountability safeguards, by U.S. commanders deployed
in foreign countries in support of stability operations.”  Many defense analysts argue
that Congress should provide geographic Combatant Commanders with flexible
funding through discretionary funds for humanitarian relief and reconstruction to
benefit local populations, based on the model of the Commander’s Emergency
Response Programs (CERP) funds for Afghanistan and Iraq.  Section 1206 (c) of the
SASC version of the FY2007 DOD authorization act (S. 2766) would authorize such
funding in FY2007 and FY2008 for all commanders of a geographic combatant
command, (with an annual limit of $200,000 per commander).
Table 1.  DOD Incremental Costs of Peacekeeping and Security Contingency Operations, FY1991-FY2005
(Millions of current year dollars)
Operation
FY1991-
FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000 FY2001 FY2002 FY2003 FY2004
FY2005
(Est.) TOTAL
AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS
Southwest Asia/Iraq
Operation Iraqi Freedom (OIF) 38,322.0 52,148.0 56,200.0 146,670.0
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch 773.1 88.9 93.1 136.0 156.4 143.7 148.6
1,372.4 626.2  —  — 
     11,023.7
Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force 1,517.3 576.3 597.3 1,497.2 954.8 755.4 963.5
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring  102.7 5.6 13.8 239.8 261.6
Vigilant Warrior  257.7  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 257.7
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup 11/98) 43.5  —  —  —  —  —  — 43.5
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98) 92.9  —  —  —  —  —  — 92.9
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group) 32.4  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 32.4
Total Southwest Asia/Iraq 2,580.5 665.2 793.1 1,638.8 1,261.4 1,138.9 1,373.5 1,372.4 38,948.2 52,148.0 56,200.0 158,120.0
Afghanistan   (Operation Enduring Freedom, OEF) 15,788.1 9,849.2 11,800.0 37,437.3
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War) 34.6  —  —  —  —  —  — 34.6
Eagle Eye (Air Verification, 10/98-03/99) 20.3  —  —  —  —  —  — 20.3
Noble Anvil (Air War) 1,891.4  —  —  —  —  —  — 1,891.4
Joint Guardian (KFOR) 1,044.5 1,803.1 1,383.9 938.2 590.4 552.9 693.3 7,006.3
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance) 141.6  —  —  —  —  —  — 141.6
Total Kosovo 3,132.4 1,803.1 1,383.9 938.2 590.4 552.9 693.3 9,094.2
Korea Readiness* 160.6  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  —  — 160.6
COMPLETED OPERATIONS
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge 2,231.7 2,087.5 1,792.8 1,431.2 1,381.8 1,213.4
932.9 742.2 667.8 150.7 14,405.1Other Former Yugoslavia Operations* 784.0 288.3 195.0 169.9 155.4 101.3 79.4
Total Bosnia 784.0 2,520.0 2,282.5 1,962.7 1,586.6 1,483.1 1,292.6 932.9 742.2 667.8 150.7 14,405.1
Totals of Haiti, Somalia, Rwanda, Angola,
Cambodia, Western Sahara, East Timor and
Liberia
2,458.2 86.9  —  — 1.5 56.8  —  — 3.1  —  — 2,606.5
GRAND TOTALS 5,983.3 3,272.1 3,075.6 3,601.5 5,981.9 4,481.8 4,050.0 3,243.5 56,072.0 63,217.9 68,844.0 221,823.6
Source:  Defense Finance and Accounting System data through FY2002; Office of the Secretary of Defense Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 Budget Estimates:  Justification for Component Contingency Operations
and the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, for FY2003; FY2004, and FY2005 (est) provided by the DOD Comptroller’s Office, June 24, 2005.  The FY2005 figures are from the FY2005
Supplemental Request of February 2005 and do not reflect approximately $31.6 billion in other support and related costs applicable to OIF and OEF.  
Notes: This chart consists of  DOD  incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral operations
(including OIF in Iraq and OEF in Afghanistan, which are combat/occupation operations), NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations.   U.N. reimbursements are not deducted.
Some totals do not add due to rounding.  Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic). Provide Promise
(humanitarian assistance), Deliberate Forge.  Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity there
as incremental costs.  NA = Not Available.
